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Note 
Constitutionalizing E-mail Privacy by Informational Access 
Manish Kumar∗ 
The popular embrace of electronic mail (e-mail)1 has not 
led to its recognition by the Supreme Court as a 
constitutionally protected realm of privacy.  Perhaps this is for 
good reason.  No prevailing legal theory for such a result 
presents itself in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  By 
analogizing the function of the Internet to the postal system, 
some courts have found an absence of a constitutional privacy 
interest because electronic data is exposed in transit like the 
writing on a postcard.2  The Supreme Court, however, has 
emphasized the social expectations regarding the use of a 
communication system as relevant to the constitutional 
analysis in other contexts, which leads to the opposite 
conclusion.3  It has not, however, gone so far as to recognize a 
general right to privacy or an interest in mere content.4  Still 
other courts have adopted modern translations of the Fourth 
Amendment, concluding that e-mails are the contemporary 
equivalent of “papers” referenced in the Fourth Amendment.5 
 © 2008 Manish Kumar. 
 * J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B. 2004, 
Stanford University.  I thank Professor Stephen Cribari for his invaluable 
guidance, the Journal’s editors and staff for their dedication in seeing this 
article to production, and my parents for everything else. 
 1. For example, electronic mail (e-mail) volume increased from 5.1 
million messages in 2000 to 135.6 million in 2005.  Lizzette Alvarez, Got 2 
Extra Hours for Your E-mail?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at G1.  This Note 
focuses on electronic mail, though its conclusions are generalizable to other 
types of electronic files. 
 2. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an 
expectation of privacy in (non-content) information disclosed to an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP)). 
 3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 4. Id. at 350 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a 
general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”). 
 5. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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An alternative approach to constitutionalizing e-mail 
privacy is to deemphasize the technological aspects and social 
expectations relating to its use.  In a line of technological 
surveillance cases culminating most recently in Kyllo v. United 
States,6 the Supreme Court has suggested the constitutional 
inquiry into what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy can be reduced to a simple question: Does the 
government have to employ special means not available to the 
public to access to the allegedly private information?  If so, 
there is a government search cognizable by the Fourth 
Amendment.7  This approach can provide a useful framework 
for analyzing e-mail privacy. 
This Note presents an informational access interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Part I describes the technological 
trends underlying the need for electronic privacy.  Part II 
describes the existing statutes regulating electronic privacy.  
Part III develops the information access theory to privacy by 
examining the prior case law.  Part IV applies the theory to e-
mail.  Part V considers some of the objections to 
constitutionalizing e-mail privacy. 
I.  A SUPERHIGHWAY LIKE NO OTHER 
Because it is so different from previous forms of 
communication, e-mail challenges traditional notions of Fourth 
Amendment privacy.  Case law discussing privacy expectations 
for other forms of communication provides imperfect analogies 
for analyzing e-mail privacy issues.  Like the postal and 
telephone systems, the Internet is a communications network 
for human-to-human contact.  Unlike the postal mail and 
telephone calls, however, a large portion of Internet traffic 
involves a single person.  For example, a user may use a 
computer to access webpages from a remote server.8  Other 
communications are fully autonomous, as when computer 
 6. 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001). 
 7. Government conduct violating an individual’s reasonable or legitimate 
expectation of privacy is a Fourth Amendment search.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 8. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: 
The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 613 (2003) [hereinafter 
Kerr, Big Brother]. 
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servers coordinate to route network traffic.9  It is therefore not 
clear to what extent one category of electronic communications 
should receive differing constitutional treatment from another. 
The Internet’s method of routing data presents other 
analytical difficulties.  The Internet is a packet-switched 
network, meaning that computers transmit information by 
reducing it into smaller groups of data, called packets.10  
Intermediate routers advance the packets from one point on the 
network to another.11  Alternatively, the routers may store, 
reassemble, and repacketize the data.12  Each packet contains 
a header identifying the origin, destination, type, and size of 
the conveyed information.13  Computers use this information to 
reassemble packets into the original communication.14  This 
process differs from the operation of the phone and postal 
systems, which do not break information down into packets.  A 
postal communication consists of a single document with 
“header” information located on the front of the envelope,15 
while the typical telephone call consists of a bidirectional 
stream of voice data preceded by a series of tones (by dialing a 
phone number) serving as the addressing information “read” by 
switching equipment.16 
A third distinguishing feature of Internet communications 
is that information often ends up with third parties.  Unlike the 
postal system, where the mail carrier relinquishes possession of 
the letter after delivering it to the addressee, Internet usage 
often involves storing information with a third party service 
provider.17  A user has no physical possession over content, 
unlike the interior contents of a letter in an envelope.  Instead, 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Samantha L. Martin, Note, Interpreting the Wiretap Act: Applying 
Ordinary Rules of “Transit” to the Internet Context, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 441, 
449 (2006). 
 13. Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 8, at 614. 
 14. Id. 
 15. The term “envelope information” describes the addressing and routing 
information that communications networks use to deliver the contents of 
communications.  Id. at 611. 
 16. Modern digital switches may also packetize information, but this does 
not appear to have affected the case law. 
 17. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209 (2004) 
[hereinafter Kerr, User’s Guide]. 
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the user often relies on a network service provider to provide a 
block of storage on a computer server, such as for an e-mail 
account.  Furthermore, third parties responsible for only 
conveying the information may nevertheless retain copies, as 
when communicating servers retain a copy of a transmitted 
packet.18  Since private data is so routinely entrusted to others, 
interested parties can discreetly obtain recorded data without 
ever entering the home. 
Technological trends reinforce the migration of private 
data into the hands of third parties.  “Always on” high-speed 
Internet connectivity encourages users to use web-enabled 
communications services.19  For example, users may rely on 
document sharing software such as Google Desktop.20  The 
program sends a copy of a user’s documents to Google’s servers, 
allowing this information to be searched and retrieved from a 
computer anywhere in the world.  It requires, however, that a 
copy of all the user’s documents reside with Google.21  
Alternatively, users may use online applications accessed via 
the Internet.  For example, instead of loading a word processor 
program installed on the computer’s hard drive, an author can 
access a server that runs the word processor program and 
maintains a copy of the author’s work via the Internet.  The 
benefits of this type of distributed computing have caused the 
Federal Aviation Administration to review its software 
procurement policies.22  The consequence of the trend toward 
remotely stored and manipulated data is that a user’s 
documents are less often within the home, which may impact 
individual and social expectations of privacy. 
 18. Martin, supra note 12, at 449. 
 19. Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 83, 83 (2006). 
 20. Google Desktop Homepage, http://www.googledesktop.com (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2007). 
 21. Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Google Copies Your 
Hard Drive — Government Smiles in Anticipation (Feb. 9th, 2006), 
http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2006/02/09. 
 22. Paul McDougall, FAA May Ditch Microsoft’s Windows Vista And Office 
For Google And Linux Combo, INFORMATION WEEK, Mar. 6, 2007, 
http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=197
800480. 
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II. EXISTING STATUTORY LAW 
Congress has attempted to regulate Internet privacy 
through two pieces of legislation: the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)23 and the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA).24 
THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 
The ECPA applies to prospective surveillance of 
information in transmission, prohibiting the interception of 
oral, wire, or electronic communications.  The Statute punishes 
anyone who “intentionally intercepts . . . any wire, oral or 
electronic communication.”25  In order to overcome this 
prohibition, the Wiretap Statute provides for a special type of 
warrant with enhanced requirements.26 
The Wiretap Act suffers from ambiguity surrounding the 
word “transmission” as used in § 2511 of the statute.  A 
provision defined “wire communication” as including 
communications in electronic storage, but the USA PATRIOT 
Act deleted this.27  Therefore, it is not clear whether 
communications in temporary electronic storage are within its 
scope, as when intermediate routing computers retain copies of 
packetized information.  Uncertainty also arises over whether 
the information, because it is simultaneously in storage and in 
transit, is subject to the heightened protections of the Wiretap 
Act or the lesser protections of the SCA.28  The First Circuit 
grappled with these issues in United States v. Councilman,29 
reversing itself en banc and finding that “an e-mail message 
does not cease to be an ‘electronic communication’ during the 
momentary intervals, intrinsic to the communication process, 
at which the message resides in transient electronic storage.”30  
Once the electronic communication reaches its destination, the 
 23. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).   
 24. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 25. 18 U.S.C § 2511(1)(a) (2000). 
 26. The warrant requires a finding, beyond probable cause, that “normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear 
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”  Id. § 2518(3)(c).  Only 
certain government officials can apply for this type of warrant.  Id. § 2516. 
 27. Martin, supra note 12, at 451. 
 28. Id. at 455–56. 
 29. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 30. Id. at 79. 
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protections of the ECPA do not apply.31  Neither does the 
ECPA prohibit Internet service providers from intercepting, 
disclosing, or using data that they transmit or receive.32 
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
If electronic information is not eligible for protection under 
the ECPA, it may still be subject to the SCA.  The SCA 
distinguishes between providers of communication services, 
who send or receive wire or electronic communications,33 and 
providers of remote computing services, who trade in “computer 
storage or processing services by means of an electronic 
communications system.”34  The former specifies that for 
unopened e-mail communications in storage for less than 180 
days, the government must obtain a search warrant for 
acquiring content information.  After 180 days, the minimum 
proof requirement drops to (1) a mere subpoena or (2) prior 
notice plus a “specific and articulable facts” court order.35  The 
same level of protection applies for opened e-mails and files in 
storage or processing.36  Both requirements are less stringent 
than the enhanced search warrant outlined in the Wiretap Act. 
The SCA is not without its loopholes.  First, it 
distinguishes between compelled and voluntary disclosures.  
Like the ECPA, the protections outlined above do not apply to 
nonpublic providers of remote computing services who 
voluntarily disclose information to the government, such as 
employers.37  Second, the SCA refers to remote computing 
services that offer processing or storage services to the public.38  
 31. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1040 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Wesley Coll v. Pitts, 974 F.Supp. 375, 389 (Del. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 861 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000); see also Joshua L. Colburn, Note, 
“Don’t Read This If It’s Not for You”: The Legal Inadequacies of Modern 
Approaches to E-mail Privacy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249 (2006) (summarizing 
commentary on this exception). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 34. Id. § 2711(2). 
 35. Id. § 2703(d) (requiring “specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [information to be compelled] 
is ‘relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation’”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. § 2702(a) (imposing restrictions on providers of services “to the 
public”). 
 38. Id. § 2711(2). 
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Some legislative history suggests this only applies to 
“outsourcing” functions.39  But “outsourcing” is an 
anachronistic term.  In the early days of computing, businesses 
sent raw data to remote computing services to perform the 
necessary calculations because powerful desktop spreadsheet 
applications did not yet exist.40  Today, however, websites are 
often computing destinations in themselves, allowing users to 
manipulate the relevant data.41  It is not clear whether using a 
website is “outsourcing” data, especially if one’s local computer 
must process data (such as to packetize it) to send it over the 
Internet to a remote server.  If processing is narrowly defined 
to exclusively consist of remote processing services, and the 
Internet service provider (ISP) is not specifically providing 
storage services to the user, then the SCA does not apply. 
The ECPA and SCA suggest that congressional rules are 
imperfect methods for protecting privacy.  The complexities of 
Internet infrastructure can lead to judicial confusion regarding 
statutory interpretation.42  If legislators try to alleviate this 
problem by writing statutes that track technologies too closely, 
they risk creating laws that soon become anachronistic.43  
Frequents revisions to such statutes are not possible given the 
administrative and opportunity costs.  Indeed, despite the 
tremendous growth of microprocessing technology, Congress 
has significantly revised the electronic surveillance law only 
five times.44  Furthermore, commentators have argued that 
congressional rulemaking has resulted in a piecemeal approach 
to electronic privacy.45  Many other forms of electronic 
surveillance are unregulated, such as global positioning 
satellite (GPS) tracking, video surveillance, facial recognition 
systems, satellite technologies, radio frequency identification 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 
3555, 3557. 
 40. Kerr, User’s Guide, supra note 17, at 1213–14. 
 41. Id. at 1230. 
 42. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.  At least one 
commentator has pointed out that the fact Orin Kerr had to write an article 
describing the basic operation of the SCA demonstrates its Byzantine nature.  
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s 
Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 766 (2005) 
(“If electronic surveillance law was clear, Kerr would have a lot less to write 
about.”). 
 43. Id. at 767–69. 
 44. Id. at 769. 
 45. Id. at 763–64. 
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(RFID) systems, and sensory enhancement technologies.46 
In light of these shortcomings, judge-made law could make 
a useful contribution by articulating broad standards to 
regulate electronic privacy.  As technology changes, courts can 
gradually revise precedent, a more practical possibility than 
getting a law passed in Washington.  Alternatively, Congress 
can provide supplementary legislation to clarify judicial 
standards.  This happened when the Supreme Court 
established general standards for protecting the content of 
telephone conversations in Berger v. New York47 and Congress 
subsequently assumed those specific provisions when writing 
the Wiretap Act.48 
So far, however, courts have played a minimal role in the 
creation of privacy rules in the electronic context.  Most of the 
statutes regulating electronic information lack an exclusionary 
rule, discouraging litigants from redressing such matters with 
the courts.49  Courts have also deferred to Congress to 
determine what deserves a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
characterizing such line-drawing as the province of the 
legislative branch.50  Judicial law, however, could provide a 
flexible standard in an area that is rapidly changing and guide 
policymakers toward framing the appropriate regulations.  The 
following presents a possible legal basis for such a standard. 
 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 48. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 214-18 (1969), as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113. 
 49. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a 
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
805, 806-07 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Lifting the “Fog”]. 
 50. E.g., Askin v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (“As new 
technologies continue to appear in the marketplace and outpace existing 
surveillance law, the primary job of evaluating their impact on privacy rights 
and of updating the law must remain with the branch of government designed 
to make such policy choices, the legislature.”); see also Adams v. City of Battle 
Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Congress made the [Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act] the primary vehicle by which to address 
violations of privacy interests in the communication field.”). 
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III. PRIOR CASE LAW AND THE INFORMATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Several policy justifications exist for protecting electronic 
communications under the Fourth Amendment, such as that it 
prevents untrammeled government surveillance,51 protects 
legitimate conduct,52 and so on.  Some commentators argue in 
normative terms for greater privacy protections, arguing that 
persons routinely entrust private information to the Internet.53  
Others make constitutional arguments, noting that the 
Supreme Court’s current stance toward electronic 
communications departs from popular expectations of 
acy.54 
The Fourth Amendment question turns not on any general 
notions of unreasonable governmental conduct, but instead 
whether there was an unreasonable search or seizure.55  This 
depends on whether government conduct violated an 
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” as described in 
Justice Harlan’s oft-cited concurrence in Katz.56  To determine 
what is a search or seizure, the analysis proceeds in two 
steps.57  The first is to ask whether the challenged 
governmental conduct violated the individual’s subjective 
                                                          
 51. Zittrain, supra note 19, at 83–84. 
ng electronic 
, the courts have mostly rejected such an 
, shall not be 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
) [hereinafter Kerr, Encryption] (providing this formulation of 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 83 (arguing that the increasing use of data networks means that 
Fourth Amendment protections for home life ought to be extended to “digital 
life”); see also Deirdre Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic 
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1586–88 (2004) (argui
information is analogous to Fourth Amendment papers). 
 54. See Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 8, at 629 n.98 (“This approach 
surely reflects honorable aspirations, but it strangely ignores the fact that in 
the thirty-five years since Katz
expansive view of its holding.”). 
 55. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
violated . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 56. Katz 
concurring). 
 57. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can 
Encryption Create A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 
503, 507 (2001
the Katz test). 
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ety is prepared to recognize as 
al protection is available 
even
                                                          
 
expectation of privacy, which almost always is the case.58  At 
that point, the analysis turns to the more essential question of 
whether the expectation is “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”59  C
erforming this inquiry.60 
There are at least two theories underlying the reasonable 
expectations inquiry for the Fourth Amendment.  The first is 
rights-based: an expectation is reasonable when it is backed by 
an enforceable right to enjoin the government’s invasion of 
privacy, such as through property law.61  For example, the 
Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois62 noted that “concepts of 
real or personal property law” could be instructive.6
me Court exemplified this theory by noting that a 
burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during 
the off season may have a thoroughly justified 
subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one 
which the law recognizes as “legitimate.”  His 
presence . . . is “wrongful”; his expectation is not 
“one that soci
‘reasonable.”’64 
Because the criminal’s presence in the cabin has no 
enforceable basis, he can have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Third party disclosure cases such as United States v. 
White65 implicitly endorse this approach.  They suggest that 
because a defendant has no right to limit the divulgences of an 
unreliable informant, no constitution
 for confidential conversations.66 
The second theory underlying the Fourth Amendment is 
based on the reasonable person in tort.  A legitimate 
expectation of privacy turns on whether a reasonable person 
placed in the individual’s shoes would expect something to 
remain confidential.67  The reasonable person in turn has an 
 58. Id. at 507. 
 59. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 60. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 61. Kerr, Encryption, supra note 57, at 507. 
 62. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 63. Id. at 143–44 n.12. 
 64. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 65. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 66. See infra Part V. 
 67. Kerr, Encryption, supra note 57, at 507. 
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es have continued to stress the predominance of 
soci
agreement.71  The Katz decision has had its share of 
 little guidance for its application, and 
objective basis, determined by the widely held beliefs of society.  
This standard originated in Katz v. United States, where the 
Supreme Court emphasized strong privacy protections for new 
technologies.68  The Katz decision presented a paradigm shift 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  It expanded the scope of 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment by deemphasizing the 
property law concepts that had immunized many forms of 
government surveillance from constitutional scrutiny.69  
Subsequent cas
al views.70 
This social expectations view of the Fourth Amendment 
holds the most potential for e-mail privacy advocates.  The 
rights-based model, on the other hand, has limited applicability 
because few demonstrable rights can enjoin an invasion of 
privacy in cyberspace.  As technology advances, situations 
implicating an individual’s expectations of privacy increasingly 
involve electronic information.  Since people routinely entrust 
private material to the Internet, this supports a finding that 
government access to the data is a search.  The problem, 
however, is that while commentators support the social 
expectations theory, the case law does not seem to be in 
criticism.72  It provides
                                                          
 68. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 69. The paradigmatic case of the pre-Katz era is Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which the Court found that wiretapping in a 
estated this factor 
 deserve the most scrupulous 
suspected bootlegger’s basement and office building did not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections because no trespass had occurred on the defendant’s 
property. 
 70. Justice Rehnquist observed that “legitimation of expectations of 
privacy by law must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment . . . [such 
as] understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”  Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–44, n.12 (1978).  The Court has r
as “our societal understanding that certain areas
protection from government.”  O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) 
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). 
 71. Kerr, Encryption, supra note 57, at 508. 
 72. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth 
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 204 n.10 (1993) (citing Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 
(1985) (“The Fourth Amendment is the Supreme Court’s tarbaby: a mass of 
contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the ‘Brethren’. . . .”); Morgan 
Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 616 (1996) (“The 
Katz approach has degenerated into a standardless ‘expectations’ analysis that 
has failed to protect either privacy or property interests.”); Morgan Cloud, 
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the Court’s subsequent pronouncements have been less than 
conclusive.73  Scholars74 and Justices75 have questioned the 
consistency of the resulting case law.  The Court has failed to 
adopt an expansive reading of Katz in the intervening years, 
saying little on the subject of electronic communications 
privacy.76  Instead, many decisions continue to be rights-based, 
focusing on property concepts in analyzing the legitimacy of 
privacy expectations.77  More recently, however, the Supreme 
Court again endorsed the social expectations theory.78  The 
                                                          
Search and 
Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 845 (1985) (criticizing 
observing “contradictory results in spite of remarkably similar facts”); Brian J. 
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment 
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 587 (1989) (“[T]he entire course of recent 
Supreme Court fourth amendment precedent . . . is misguided and 
inconsistent with the spirit of the fourth amendment.”); Nadine Strossen, The 
Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the 
Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988) (criticizing 
Fourth Amendment balancing as a methodology because it dilutes liberty); 
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief 
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 383 (1988) (arguing that the 
Court has failed “to develop a coherent analytical framework” for the Fourth 
Amendment); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 20, 20 (1988) (“[T]here is 
virtual unanimity . . . that the Court simply has made a mess of search and 
seizure 
Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial 
law.”); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of 
ality of the circumstances inquiry rather 
d the Supreme Court has since revisited privacy 
t has 
ed as “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable . . . it may 
o refine . . . .”  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 78. g for 
the ma
Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1080 
(1987). 
 73. For example, the Supreme Court has phrased the determinative 
factors for a socially acceptable expectation of privacy as “the intention of the 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment, . . . the uses to which the individual has 
put a location, . . . and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve 
the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.”  California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 220 (1986) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 178 (1984)).  This suggests a tot
than a strict standard, an
expectations on a case-by-case basis. 
 74. See supra note 72. 
 75. Justice Scalia’s assessment of the Katz doctrine conceded that i
been criticiz
be difficult t
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).  Justice Souter, writin
jority, observed 
 The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness . . . is the great significance given to widely 
shared social expectations, which are naturally enough 
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types of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
Court’s embrace of social expectations in the consent context 
suggests it may play a role in other 
                                                          
influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its 
rules . . . the reasonableness of such a search is in significant 
part a function of commonly held understandings about the 
authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect 
each other’s interests. 
Id. at 111.  Notably, the Court chose not
d in property law.  Id.
 to apply a more formal rights-based 
 at 110 (“The common authority that 
u Fourth Amendment may thus be broader than the rights 
erty law.”).  The Chief Justice questioned the scope of 
 social expectations concept but agreed that it could be used 
ther there was a government search.  Id. at 130 (Roberts, 
.J ing). 
approach grounde
co s undnt er the 
accorded by prop
applicability of the
to determine whe
C ., dissent
MANISH KUMAR. CONSTITUTIONALIZING E-MAIL PRIVACY BY INFORMATIONAL ACCESS. MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 2008;9(1):257-286.  
270 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:1 
 
imagers not being in the general public use.85  This forms the 
 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE AND PUBLICLY EXPOSED 
INFORMATION 
Fourth Amendment cases involving surveillance 
technology provide a possible basis for constitutionalizing e-
mail privacy.  Kyllo v. United States79 is the most recent in this 
line of cases.  It involved the government’s use of a thermal 
imager to detect infrared radiation emitting from inside a 
home.80  Special lamps for growing marijuana plants may give 
off this type of radiation.  Without ever setting foot on the 
petitioner’s property, the government agent scanned the home 
and used this information to obtain a warrant to search the 
premises.81  The Court held, “[w]here, as here, the Government 
uses a device not in general public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”82  Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, suggested a rights-based 
approach to privacy expectations, noting that the search 
involved the interior of the home, which is “the prototypical and 
hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy.”83  As 
a result, there is a “ready criterion, with roots deep in the 
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy . . . that is 
acknowledged to be reasonable.”84 
In order to reach this conclusion, it was necessary for the 
Court to analyze the technology used to conduct the 
government surveillance.  It twice rested its holding on thermal 
basis for the informational access interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  A significant factor for defining a Fourth 
mA endment “search” is the extent of public access to the 
information sought to be suppressed.  Had the telltale heat 
signature produced by the defendant’s growing lamps been 
                                                          
 79. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (2001). 
 80. Id. at 29. 
 81. Id. at 30. 
 82. Id. at 40. 
 83. Id. at 34. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (“[A]t least where (as here) the technology in question is not in 
ic use.”); id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device general publ
that is not in general public use.”). 
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ion through either aided or unaided means.  
For 
e mere fact that the 
info
readily accessible because the public regularly used thermal 
imagers, the Court would have arrived at the opposite result.86  
According to this approach, the use of technology is not the 
dispositive factor; rather, it is the extent of accessibility to the 
relevant informat
example, if it had been snowing on the night of the 
surveillance, and one could readily observe an unusual pattern 
of snowmelt on the roof of the defendant’s home, there would be 
no search because that information was available to passersby 
who were members of the public.87 
Justice Scalia’s response to an objection that the 
information was already in the public domain supports the 
view of reasonable privacy expectations turning on information 
access.88  There was a colorable argument that the heat 
signature was merely information being radiated from the 
external surface of the house.89  The Court responded that this 
was a “mechanical” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.90  
Justice Scalia referenced other examples where it would have 
found a denial of Fourth Amendment protections problematic.91  
The Court seemed to reason that th
rmation existed in the public domain was irrelevant.  
Instead, it was the inability to meaningfully access and 
interpret it through readily available means that created the 
privacy invasion. 
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has relied on 
the public accessibility of information to determine the scope of 
a constitutional privacy interest.  In Katz, government agents 
placed a microphone outside a telephone booth to overhear a 
                                                          
 86. The 2007 Mercedes Benz S-Class sedan comes equipped with an 
infrared camera for nighttime driving.  2007 Mercedes-Benz S-Class, 
POPSCI.COM, http://www.popsci.com/cars/article/2005-11/2007-mercedes-benz-
s-class.  This camera is functionally similar to the thermal imager in Kyllo, 
and suggests that had Kyllo been decided more recently, the government’s 
ans for arguing the 
ure, but the majority 
rgument as “irrelevant” because “on the night of January 
server could have discerned the relative heat of Kyllo’s 
g.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2. 
rom a house.  Id. at 35. 
evidence might not have been excluded. 
 87. The dissent raised this possibility as a me
information collected from the imager was public in nat
characterized this a
16, 1992, no outside ob
home without thermal imagin
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 35. 
 90. Id. 
 91. The Court referenced a satellite picking up light from a house or a 
microphone picking up sound f
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he phone call theoretically could have been 
over
rth Amendment did not require law 
enfo
to the public domain (the heat signatures and 
the ad a 
priv want 
        
 
conversation.92  T
heard by a member of the public, but the Court found the 
placement of the microphone to have no constitutional 
significance.93  Instead, it was the fact that the microphone 
created an uninvited ear undetectable to the defendant that 
implicated the constitutional interest.94  Because the public 
could not have been similarly situated, either because such 
recording devices were not generally used by the public, or 
because a member of the public standing near the booth would 
have provoked the suspicion of the caller, the Court found that 
a Fourth Amendment search occurred. 
California v. Ciraolo95 continued the line of cases where 
reasonable expectations of privacy turn on public accessibility 
to information.  Responding to an anonymous tip about the 
cultivation of marijuana, a police officer flew a private plane 
over the respondent’s house within navigable airspace and 
photographed the backyard using a standard thirty-five 
millimeter camera.96  Justice Burger, writing for the majority, 
found no constitutionally cognizable search, and wrote 
famously that the Fou
rcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a 
home.97  He cited Katz for the proposition that one could waive 
a privacy expectation by exposing information to the public.98  
The fact that the cultivation area was within the curtilage was 
not dispositive.99 
Ciraolo presents a tension when compared to the facts of 
Kyllo.  In both cases, the petitioner released incriminating 
information in
appearance of the marijuana plants), the information h
ate character (in neither case did the homeowners 
                                                  
 92. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 93. Id. at 353. 
. (citing 
s within the curtilage does 
.”). Part V discusses this waiver doctrine in 
 94. See id. 
 95. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 96. Id. at 209–10. 
 97. Id. at 213. 
 98. “‘What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’”  Id
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967)). 
 99. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (“That the area i
not itself bar all police observation
more detail. 
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thei a 
pers ases 
dive the 
infor ourt 
note ts.100  
The ying 
in th hing 
that adily 
acce lied.  
Con ral 
publ as not 
aw 
enfo
 . . . [i]f the public rarely, if ever, travels 
400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably expect his 
                                                          
r activities to be detected), and both cases involved 
onal residence.  The reason the outcome in these two c
rged is explained by availability of access to 
mation sought to be suppressed.  In Ciraolo, the C
d the routine nature of private and commercial fligh
consequence of this was that “[a]ny member of public fl
is airspace who glanced down could have seen everyt
 these officers observed.”101  The information was re
ssible, and hence no constitutional protections app
versely, in Kyllo, the thermal imager was not in the gene
ic use,102 and the information it uncovered w
generally accessible.  The result in Ciraolo would have been 
different if access to the flight path was restricted to l
rcement personnel. 
Florida v. Riley103 confirmed public access to protected 
information as a cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment 
inquiry.  On facts similar to Ciraolo, a law enforcement agent 
flew a helicopter within public navigable airspace at a height of 
400 feet above the defendant’s residence to view the marijuana 
plants growing inside.104  Writing separately, Justice O’Connor 
clarified the standard following from Ciraolo in her 
concurrence: 
[C]onsistent with Katz, we must ask whether the 
helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude 
at which members of the public travel with 
sufficient regularity that Riley’s expectation of 
privacy from aerial observation was not “one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 
Thus .
overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot 
be said to be from a vantage point generally used by 
the public and Riley cannot be said to have 
“knowingly expose[d]” his greenhouse to public view.  
However, if the public can generally be expected to 
travel over residential backyards at an altitude of 
 “In an ag ic airways 
ana plants 
rotected from being observed . . . .”  Id. at 215. 
ote 85 and accompanying text. 
5, 445 (1989). 
100. e where private and commercial flight in the publ
is routine, it is unreasonable . . . to expect that [defendant’s] mariju
were constitutionally p
 101. Id. at 213–14. 
 102. See supra n
 103. 488 U.S. 44
 104. Id.  
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ent investigation of a drug 
111  Law enforceme ts used a commercially 
rhear the defendant’s 
conv
 
curtilage to be free from such aerial observation.105 
Finding the inspection conducted with the helicopter to be 
routine, the Court held that it did not constitute a search.106 
The Court has considered the constitutional relevance of 
public access to information in contexts outside the home as 
well.  Dow Chemical Company v. United States,107 another 
flyover case, involved a business entity.  The Court found a 
constitutional difference between the privacy interest of the 
home and the “outdoor areas or spaces between structures and 
buildings of a manufacturing plant.”108  Nevertheless, the 
decision suggested that the same calculus based on public 
access to information was applicable: “It may well be, as the 
Government concedes, that surveillance of private property by 
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally 
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be 
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”109  A future 
Supreme Court could therefore rely on this language to apply 
the information access approach to privacy expectations outside 
the home. 
Public access to information sought to be protected under 
the Fourth Amendment has been a dispositive factor in lower 
court decisions as well.  For example, in Askin v. McNulty,110 
the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the government could 
monitor telephone conversations between the appellant and a 
third party as part of a pre-indictm
conspiracy. nt agen
available radio scanner to ove
ersation.  The court observed that “[t]hese signals can be 
intercepted with relative ease by standard AM radios.”112  The 
court likened the situation to cases involving conversations 
with government informants, finding that the defendant had 
assumed the risk of negating a legitimate expectation of 
privacy by “broadcast[ing] the conversation over radio waves to 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations o
106 at 451–52. 
mitted). 
 . Id. 
 107. 476 U.S. 227 (1985). 
t 238. 
 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 108. Id. at 236. 
 109. Id. a
 110. 47 F.3d 100
 111. Id. at 101. 
 112. Id. 
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all 
EXP
method.  Recall that in Ciraolo and Riley, members of the 
 f
within range who wish to overhear.”113  Similarly, in 
McKamey v. Roach,114 the Seventh Circuit held that there was 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cordless phone 
conversation because “[the] communications are broadcast over 
the radio waves to all those who wish to overhear . . . [and] are 
easily intercepted.”115  These decisions rested on the fact that 
the information being exposed was accessible through standard 
household appliances in the general public use.  Moreover, once 
captured with an AM radio, the radio signals required no 
specialized interpretation or analysis, since they were readily 
converted into an intelligible format. 
Kyllo, the airplane flyover cases, and the cordless phone 
cases demonstrate that the crucial factor in assessing the 
legitimacy of a privacy expectation turns not on the fact that 
the information was disclosed to public, but that once disclosed, 
the public had a ready, generally available means to 
understand the information. 
ECTATIONS, ACCESS, AND E-MAIL 
The precedent discussed above suggests that a user’s e-
mail privacy turns on whether the public has general access to 
the electronic information obtained by the government.  If so, 
then the user cannot have a legitimate expectation that the 
information will remain private.  If the information is not 
readily accessible, it falls within a similar set of facts to Kyllo, 
where the information, though technically released into the 
public domain, was not intelligible by the public and hence 
implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
E-mail information stored on third party servers is difficult 
to access.  The first possible way to obtain such information is 
through retrospective surveillance, defined as the retrieval of 
information from a third party server.  There is a minimal 
possibility of regular human observation through such a 
public could view the contraband from within public navigable 
airspace because civilian travel was common.116  No analogous 
means exist or the public to view the streams of data sent over 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 105. 
 114. 55 F.3d 1236 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 115. Id. at 1239–40. 
 116. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986). 
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 The officers in the 
flyov
an Standard Code for 
Info
 
the Internet because it cannot regularly access the servers 
hosted by third parties.  Moreover, service providers usually 
attempt to safeguard such information from the public.117  
While computer hackers and other cybersecurity threats 
abound, the informational access theory does not seem to 
require a server be an impenetrable fortress, but merely that 
the reasonable person cannot, without violating applicable law, 
gain access to one.  The thermal imager in Kyllo, after all, was 
commercially available at the time it was used.118 
Even if third party servers were easily accessed, the 
layperson must be able to intelligibly interpret the information 
to overcome constitutional objections. 
er cases were trained in marijuana detection, but the 
Court rejected this as a salient consideration, presumably 
because anyone could have seen the plants and figured out its 
species with a reference book.119  A more difficult problem 
occurs when taking information off a server.  Computer data in 
stored form does not appear as coherent letters, numbers, and 
images, but instead as an unintelligible stream of 1s and 0s.  
Even if a member of the public knew they were looking at an e-
mail address, they would probably not immediately know that 
0110001001101111011000100100000001100001 translated to 
“bob@aol.com” according to the Americ
rmation Exchange (ASCII).120  In fact, in many cases this 
type of interpretation presents so much of a challenge that the 
government obtains the information directly from the service 
provider by court order.121  A member of the public would 
therefore need analogous access to these tools in a generally 
available means, which does not seem possible given the 
current state of technology.  To this extent, the information is 
as inaccessible as the heat signatures that required exotic 
equipment to detect in Kyllo, or the hypothetical satellite 
discussed in Dow that could yield a special, high-resolution 
                                                          
 117. See, e.g., Google Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, 
om/privacypolicy.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007). http://www.google.c
 118. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1044 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 119. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (1986) (“That the observation from aircraft 
was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to 
recognize marijuana is irrelevant.”). 
 120. Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 8, at 650. 
 121. Id. at 652. 
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by.  This presents multiple problems because not only 
y to physically connect to a particular 
t also overcome the various protocols 
desi
iece of software called “Carnivore” that 
ose, and has installed black boxes 
cont
image of the industrial curtilage.  Because the layperson cannot 
access such information, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
an expectation of privacy could be found. 
Unlike retrospective surveillance, prospective surveillance 
involves the capture of information while it is in transit over a 
network.  However, the same confounds to general accessibility 
apply.  To pass muster under the public access doctrine, a 
layperson would need to be able to view a section of a network 
in the same way that Ciraolo’s backyard was exposed to 
passers
must the user find a wa
network, but she mus
gned to discourage hackers, such as anti-virus software, 
encryption codes, and system firewalls. 
Even if there was regular access to the transmitted 
information, the resulting data would be meaningless unless 
one could interpret the information.  Depending on the point of 
access, surveillance activity could yield a “full pipe” of 
information, similar to trying to listen to all the phone 
conversations going through a telephone switchboard at 
once.122  A layperson would then need a filtering device to 
convert this data into intelligible information.  One possibility 
is a special piece of software called a packet sniffer, which is 
programmed to look for a certain combination of 1s and 0s 
corresponding, for example, to a particular e-mail address.123  
The FBI has a special p
it used for this purp
aining computers running this software at the offices of 
various service providers.124  This type of government activity 
is precisely the sort that Kyllo characterized as nonpublic 
conduct.  Therefore, unless this type of software is made 
generally available, and the public regularly uses it, it seems 
                                                          
 122. The FBI has abandoned its earlier packet sniffing device called 
Carnivore (later renamed DCS-1000) in favor of this full-pipe surveillance.  
Note this requires extensive computing capabilities, both to store all the 
information traveling through the network and later to apply a filter to 
Wil ackets— Family Overview, 
overview (last visited Oct. 18, 
recover the information that is necessary.   
 123. A commercial application is available for system administrators called 
“EtherPeek.” It is, however, rather expensive, and has a specialized user 
interface.  The only point in purchasing this software would be to administer a 
network. dp Etherpeek—
http://www.wildpackets.com/products/etherpeek/
2007). 
 124. Kerr, Big Brother, supra note 8, at 654. 
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unli
i
possible step had been taken to bar access.127  The Court was 
etitioner’s argument rather than 
n of the Fourth 
his would be a significant repudiation of Katz, 
ot intend the 
 
                                        
kely that the release of this information into a networked 
environment could defeat a Fourth Amendment constitutional 
claim. 
OBJECTIONS 
Three issues arise when talking about privacy expectations 
for e-mail.  The first arises from the fact that the general public 
use cases discussed above seem to involve privacy around the 
home.  This is a problem in the Internet context, since 
computer usage does not necessarily have a domestic boundary.  
The second problem relates to the Supreme Court’s reluctance 
to recognize constitutional protections with respect to existing 
communications networks, in particular the postal mail and 
telephone systems.  Finally, the privacy argument must 
contend with prior jurisprudence finding a waiver of 
constitutional protections when a matter is disclosed to third 
parties, such as through a business record.  Each objection is 
considered in turn. 
WHERE IS THE HOME? 
Much of the case law cited in the previous section involves 
the veil of privacy surrounding the home, characterized in Kyllo 
as the “prototypical” area of privacy.125  Arguably, the Internet 
surveillance context is different, because it involves 
information being sent outside the home.  Support for this 
approach also comes from Dow, where the Court observed that 
industrial curtilage could not enjoy the same protections as 
domestic curtilage.126 
There is reason, however, to limit the language in Dow and 
Kyllo discussed above.  In the case of Dow, the petitioner 
argued that its exposed manufacturing facilities were 
analogous to the curtilage surround ng a home because every 
simply addressing the p
articulating a requirement for the operatio
Amendment.  T
which suggested that the Framers did n
                  
 125. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2006). 
 126. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1985). 
 127. Dow, 476 U.S. at 236. 
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tutionally protected area.’”128  
also observed that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
s.’”129  Finally, the Court was 
will
reasonableness analysis to be tied to specific places like the 
home or a telephone booth: “[T]he correct solution of Fourth 
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by 
incantation of the phrase ‘consti
Katz 
people—and not simply ‘area
ing to consider an informational access Fourth Amendment 
argument in Riley, which involved not a home, but an 
industrial chemicals plant.130  The Supreme Court has also 
recognized reasonable expectations of privacy of private 
employees in the workplace.131  The case law therefore does not 
suggest that a legitimate expectation of privacy can only be 
invaded in the home. 
Additionally, it is not clear that Internet usage does not 
implicate the home in the first place to the extent that access 
occurs from within its confines.  Arguably, the government 
would reach into the home if it were to search data over a 
network sent to or from a computer located in a home.  In 
Berger v. New York, the Court suggested this type of “virtual 
presence” theory when it suggested that electronically bugging 
the defendant’s telephone effectively placed a government 
agent inside the home.132  However, there may be significant 
exceptions, such as the workplace,133 and the fact that users 
often “surf” the Internet outside their homes via wireless 
networks.  It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find a 
Fourth Amendment interest in all forms of Internet 
communications in all instances. 
POSTCARDS AND TELEPHONES 
Another objection to protecting e-mail and remotely stored 
files relies on prior jurisprudence relating to postcards and 
telephone calls.134  Conveying information over the Internet is 
                                                          
 128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
, 2008 WL 59457 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2008) (finding 
 v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1238), 
 129. Id. at 353. 
 130. See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
 131. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968). 
 132. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64–65 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 133. But see United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, No. 07-6712
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hard drive contents 
of his workplace computer). 
 134. See, e.g., Brief for Orin S. Kerr as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant, United States
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s, stores, and transmits this data.  
In th
shable from electronic communications 
beca
 postcard provides a good analogy for 
packe
I en a 
mach hine-
based ge in 
diffic ure” 
impli  the 
fact t ected 
          
 
like the writing on a postcard or dialing a phone number, the 
argument goes, because it shares information with the operator 
of the network who processe
e context of communications networks, the Supreme Court 
has found no privacy in the information on the exterior of an 
envelope135 or in the numbers dialed over a telephone136 
precisely because this type of information is disclosed to the 
network provider.  However, because the envelope is sealed, 
and a closed connection established after dialing and receiving 
an answer on the other end of the line, the courts have 
recognized a constitutional interest in the content of these 
communications.137  Conversely, an e-mail is as constitutionally 
“open” as a conversation overheard on a public bus, because it 
lacks this last step isolating the communication from the 
outside world. 
To counter this argument, it is necessary to consider 
several limitations of the analogy.  The envelope information on 
a postcard is distingui
use the exposure of this content information is a necessary 
byproduct of the instrumentality of communication.  In other 
words, it would be impossible to protect the information on this 
type of mail from exposure to a postal worker who must read 
the address information to deliver the letter.  Given that this 
type of reliance on human exposure is not present in the 
telephone or Internet cases, which rely on automated systems, 
it is not clear why a
tized streams of data. 
s there a constitutionally relevant “exposure” wh
ine reads electronic data?  The problem with a mac
 exposure theory is that it would force courts to enga
ult line-drawing to define when a mechanical “expos
cates a privacy interest.  The challenge arises from
hat the Internet is essentially a series of interconn
                                                
L 32139374, at 6 [hereinafter Kerr, Amicus]. 
United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979) (no F
2002 W
 135. ourth 
Amendment protection for the non-content envelope information on the 
exterior of postal letters). 
elephone numbers, e.g. pen register information). 
 136. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in t
 137. Berger, 388 U.S. at 51 (recognizing a privacy interest in telephone 
conversations). 
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mach e.138  
There can also be subsidiary processing steps that further 
com
 device employed in Katz, for pen registers 
nly 
the telephone numbers that have been dialed—a 
hing communication. Neither the 
sense.  The telephone system and the Internet both rely on 
rries both voice and data 
ines that all “read” the data they send and receiv
plicate this question.  For example, some web-based e-mail 
programs automatically “expose” an e-mail when they scan it 
for viruses.139  A definition of exposure turning on human 
access provides the more workable standard while keeping 
prior jurisprudence relating to telephones intact, since the 
phone system also uses machines that “read” data in the form 
of dialing information. 
Additionally, it is not clear that the phone and e-mail 
systems provide a persuasive analogy to communications over 
the Internet.  Unlike these other forms of communication, the 
Internet does not separate information between envelope and 
content.  In recognizing an absence of a Fourth Amendment 
interest in the case of pen registers, the Supreme Court 
specifically limited its holding to noncontent information based 
upon this distinction: 
[A] pen register differs significantly from the 
listening
do not acquire the contents of communications. This 
Court recently noted: “Indeed, a law enforcement 
official could not even determine from the use of a 
pen register whether a communication existed. 
These devices do not hear sound. They disclose o
means of establis
purpose of any communication between the caller 
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor 
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by 
pen registers.”140 
A narrower analogy to the telephone system makes more 
streams of data sent over networks.  In the case of Internet 
ac s DSL, t e sa caces  via h me network 
and depends upon digital switching.  Human exposure to 
content information is not necessary for the functioning of 
                                                          
 138. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 531, 551–54 (2005). 
 139. See id. at 554 (suggesting a search should occur when digital 
information is exposed to human observation). 
 140. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (citing United States v. 
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). 
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t the information cannot be detected by third parties, 
sinc
 
either communications medium.  It is therefore not clear why 
there should be a constitutional difference between streams of 
data flowing through the servers of an ISP and the streams of 
data flowing through a telephone switch.  The best reading of 
Berger is not that Fourth Amendment legitimacy flows from the 
fact tha
e this decision did not even discuss the fact that a phone 
call consists of a closed circuit between two callers.141  Instead, 
the decision focused on the invasive nature of the government 
conduct at issue, suggesting a constitutional interest in private 
conversation. 
E-mail, because it is not susceptible to this clear 
distinction, encourages a different approach.  By focusing the 
constitutional inquiry on access to an undifferentiated body of 
information, courts can better analyze privacy expectations for 
electronic information transmitted over the Internet. 
THIRD PARTY WAIVER 
Expectations of privacy are not indestructible.  Katz, for all 
its expansiveness in announcing a constitutional privacy 
interest, limited its holding to when “a person knowingly 
expose[d information] to the public.”142  The Court has been 
unwilling to find that a defendant retains a constitutionally 
cognizable expectation of privacy when exposing information in 
a manner potentially discoverable by the government.  This 
waiver applies whether the defendant exposes the information 
herself or by entrusting the information to an unreliable third 
party. 
Related to this general waiver theory is the business 
records exception to the Fourth Amendment.  This theory holds 
                                                          
 141. Kerr, Amicus, supra note 134, at 7. 
, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  Katz cited two cases: 
ited States involved a defendant inviting an undercover agent to 
gs.  385 U.S. 206, 211 (1967).  In United States v. Lee, the 
ontainers of alcohol to government agents from the deck of 
. 559, 563 (1927).  In both cases, because the defendant 
. White rejected a motion 
ed from a government informant who relayed the 
 wearing an electronic transmitter on his body.  
, 748–54 (1971). 
 142. Katz v. United States
Lewis v. Un
his home to buy dru
defendant exposed c
his boat.  274 U.S
voluntarily shared the incriminating information, the Court found no 
ab at 212; Lee, 274 U.S. at reason le expectation of privacy.  Lewis, 385 U.S. 
650.  Relying upon similar reasoning, United States v
to suppress testimony obtain
contents of a conversation by
401 U.S. 745
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endant’s financial records from 
his 
ere the business records of the bank, which had 
a su
that information given over to a third party quashes an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in that material.  
The paradigmatic case is United States v. Miller,143 where the 
government subpoenaed the def
bank.144  The Court rejected the defendant’s motion to 
suppress, holding that there was no intrusion into a zone of 
constitutional privacy.145  The Court rejected the argument 
that the records were constitutionally protected “private 
papers” because the documents contained information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and were exposed to 
employees in the ordinary course of business.146  The petitioner 
could not argue that he possessed or owned the information 
because they w
bstantial stake in the “availability” and “acceptance” of 
those records.147  The Court cited White for the proposition that 
the depositor took the risk that the information could be 
conveyed by the bank to the Government.148  It reasoned along 
similar lines in Couch v. United States,149 finding no 
expectation of privacy in records provided to an accountant for 
preparing a tax return.150   
 The Court extended this doctrine to the electronic 
context in Smith v. Maryland,151 where the Supreme Court did 
not find a Fourth Amendment interest in information acquired 
by a pen register, a device that records dialed numbers.152  The 
Court reasoned that because the devices were located at the 
phone company rather than the home, people must “know that 
they must convey numerical information to the phone company 
[and cannot] harbor any general expectation that the numbers 
they dial will remain secret.”153 
The system of electronic privacy protections established by 
Congress focuses on the mode through which communications 
                                                          
 143. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 440. 
 146. Id. at 442. 
 147. Id. at 440. 
iting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)). 
1972). 
 148. Id. at 443 (c
 149. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (
 150. Id. 
 151. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 743. 
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tation would have 
to ov
 
wer
uit or a passive 
 
are transmitted.154  Congress assumed that electronic 
communications and information stored with third parties was 
analogous to the business records cases outlined above.155  
Given that Congress has found the business records cases 
apposite authority, a legitimate privacy expec
ercome the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize one on 
similar facts. 
But are the facts truly so analogous to the Internet 
context?  There is at least a colorable argument that the 
answer to this question is no.156  The first important difference 
has been termed the “independent interest” factor.  The parties 
in the business records cases needed them for carrying out a 
specific task.  The accountant in Couch needed the records for 
preparing a tax return.  The bank in Miller needed to maintain 
the record for accounting purposes and tax audits.  The Court 
noted that the banks rely on the acceptance and availability of 
these records.157  Similarly, the dialed phone numbers in Smith
e essential records to the phone company for connecting and 
billing purposes. The general proposition suggested by these 
cases is that because the parties had an interest in the 
information being sought by the government, they were free to 
share this with the authorities without implicating the 
constitutional rights of the defendant. 
Electronic communications are distinguishable from the 
business record cases.  E-mail information or remotely stored 
data is not a business record at all, since the business of 
operating a website or ISP does not require access to 
informational content, with the exception of the packet header.  
No revelation of the substance of the communication is 
required for a functional purpose like the accounting records in 
Couch and Miller, or the phone numbers for billing purposes in 
Smith.158  The service provider acts as a cond
                                                          
 154. Mulligan, supra note 53, at 1576–78. 
 155. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 (1986), at 23, 72–73. 
 156. See Mulligan, supra note 53, at 1579–82 (discussing the three 
ith the Google’s e-mail 
oint is that Google does not make a record of 
 
proceeding factors). 
 157. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1974). 
 158. In some cases, some “revelation” of the information does occur.  For 
example, a service provider might automatically scan the contents of the e-
mail to post a relevant advertisement, as is the case w
service.  However, the relevant p
the contents of the e-mail or expose it to human view.
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t because 
cust
 the communication, and service providers take 
elaborate measures to maintain the privacy of their customers. 
The final differen nature of the record 
itsel
strange to find the information was 
available according to the public access doctrine.  Kyllo seems 
to be the only Supreme Court case juxtaposing these two 
factors, and there the Court suggested that the inaccessible 
nature of the information was the determinative factor for 
                                                          
receptacle for the information sought to be protected.  It makes 
no difference to the ISP, in other words, whether the e-mail 
contains a string of gibberish or a love letter. 
A second crucial difference focuses on the voluntary nature 
of the disclosure.  In Couch and Miller, the petitioner chose to 
give the information in exchange for some sort of service, i.e. 
accounting and banking.  In Smith, the Court noted that the 
numbers were shared with the phone company in par
omers requested the phone company to track nuisance 
callers and consented to be billed.  In all three cases, the 
information was imparted to the third party as the end result 
of the individual’s actions.  With e-mail, however, the user does 
not intend to allow the service provider to access the content 
information of
ce arises from the 
f.  Both Miller and Smith suggested that the information 
contained in the record was not confidential.  In Miller, the 
Court noted that the checks and deposit slips were “not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be 
used in commercial transactions.”159  In Smith, the Court noted 
that the information exposed was de minimis, since the pen 
register only recorded phone numbers and did not reveal 
whether the parties actually communicated and what the 
parties may have communicated about.160  Moreover, phone 
numbers are assigned by the telephone company, and can 
usually be found in a phone book.  Courts should therefore 
make the same distinction between envelope and content 
information for e-mails, however problematic that may be, as 
they do in the case of telephone conversations. 
What happens when information is exposed, but not 
readily accessible?  Two doctrines seem in conflict: The general 
waiver cases161 suggest there can be no expectation of privacy.  
On the other hand, if the information is exposed but 
inaccessible, it seems 
 159. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
d, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  160. See Smith v. Marylan
 161. See supra note 142. 
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characterizing the governmental conduct as a search. 
An Internet communication bears little resemblance to the 
information shared with third parties in Couch, Miller, and 
Smith.  The Court’s attempts to grapple with the constitutional 
status of information in Kyllo and its predecessors provide the 
better resolution to the constitutional questions presented by e-
mail privacy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The particular issues raised by e-mail privacy draw 
attention to society’s reliance on the rapid and unfettered 
dissemination of a broad range of information.  In Kyllo, Justice 
Scalia observed the interrelationship between technology and 
privacy, writing, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree 
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has 
been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”F162F  It is 
unclear, however, whether the Court’s wariness toward the 
revelatory power of technology will extend to e-mail, because it 
is society, not the government, that has chosen to use this 
technology.  The Kyllo line of cases suggests one way our 
increasingly digital lifestyles can receive the same sort of 
constitutional protections we take for granted in other contexts.  
To the extent that the reasonableness of an expectation of 
privacy for the contents of e-mail is far from certain, it suggests 
that the oftentimes unconditional embrace of technology, and 
its implications on ways of living, deserves our careful 
reflection. 
                                                          
 162. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001). 
